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The Dilemma of Delegating Search: 
Budgeting in Public Employment Services 
 
The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be 
explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In 
markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers 
with relevant vacancies. Because their search intensity in contacting employers and 
collecting data is not verifiable by the central authority, a typical moral hazard problem can 
arise. To overcome the delegation problem and provide high-powered incentives for high 
levels of search effort on the part of job centers, we propose output-related schemes that 
assign greater staff capacity to agencies achieving high strike rates. 
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In this paper we provide an incentive-compatible mechanism for the optimal funding of 
the  public  employment  service,  which  is  commissioned  to  minimize  job  match 
unemployment in the labor market. Frictions characterize even regular labor markets 
because information about job offers and job seekers is neither costless nor easy to 
obtain, so that it may take some not inconsiderable amount of time to effect successful 
job matches in the labor market. Moreover, the delegation of information gathering to 
job  seekers  might  be  inefficient  to  some  extent  due  to  the  public  good  features  of 
information.  The  need  to  smooth  such  frictions  explains  the  actions  of  numerous 
governments in setting up public employment services. Such agencies may on search-
theoretic grounds be regarded as matchmakers, providing unemployed workers with 
information about vacancies.1 Search theory predicts that public employment services 
will support job seekers in part by increasing the intensity of job search. The greater the 
number of contacts made, the greater the strike rate and the lower the expected average 
duration of unemployment.  
However, there is empirical evidence that the matching outcomes attained by 
publicly provided employment services in many European countries are lamentable 
(see, for example, Addison and Portugal, 2002, who document the poor outcomes 
achieved by the Portuguese public employment service).2 One potent source of failure 
may reflect agency considerations inherent in delegating the task of search to others. 
The present paper exploits such notions. It first sketches the nature of the incentive -
structure  within  the  public  employment  system before  deriving  optimal budgeting 
schemes that can overcome the agency problem. 
We  argue  that  a  hidden  action  problem  dogs  public  employment  systems. 
Although the main economic rationale for setting up a public employment  service is 
rooted in the lack of information in labor markets, with frictions on both sides of the 
market limiting beneficial trades, consider the problem inherent in the structure of the 
public employment service. The organization  consists of a central em ployment office 
(the principal) which delegates the task of gathering information about vacancies to  
                                                           
1 We regard the job center as a matchmaker acting in similar fashion to a  ҴӁ ש םי כӕҼӓҼי  (shidduch) or yenta in 
Jewish communities arranging marriages between the children of suitable families.  
2 Earlier such studies include Wielgosz and Carpenter, 1987; Jones, 1988; Blau and Robbins, 1990; Winter-
Ebmer, 1991; Bishop, 1993. However, for a more optimistic view, see Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; 
Thomas, 1997.  
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local job centers (the agents). An informational gap between the central employment 
office and the job center opens up as the latter goes about its business. Specifically, 
agents  entrusted  with  gathering  data  on  job  vacancies  learn  by  doing.    In  these 
circumstances, the agent’s effort cannot be observed by the principal, and if the realized 
unemployment rate is only a noisy signal of the local job center’s search effort a moral 
hazard problem arises naturally from the delegation of the search function. A second 
main ingredient of this moral hazard problem is the conflict between agent and principal 
about  the  nature  of  the  employment  service  to  be  offered.  Agents  that  act  as 
intermediaries in the labor market search process have to bear the cost of the search 
effort  necessary  to  effectively  combat  matching  unemployment  while  the  central 
employment  office  seeks  to  implement  the  government’s  labor  market  policy  at  the 
lowest budget cost. Consequently, a  job  center tends to  reduce  unobservable  search 
effort if the ‘random’ unemployment rate compounds the job center’s search effort and 
pure luck. 
To illustrate the moral hazard problem we shall present a model in which a risk 
averse job center chooses its search effort and the binary outcome of the search process 
(the unemployment rate) can be either high or low. First, we show that an incentive-
compatibility constraint must be met inducing a high search effort on part of the job 
center. Second, we introduce a constraint defining the maximum work load that can be 
demanded of placement officers by the central employment service. The set of incentive-
feasible budgeting mechanisms must satisfy these two constraints.  Among the set of 
incentive-feasible schemes, we seek to identify those that achieve high search effort at 
minimum cost. In general, the incentive-compatibility constraint is binding if effort is 
unobservable. Therefore, the central employment office must offer an information rent 
in the second-best optimum.  
Apart  from  these  informational  and  physical  constraints,  we  also  take  into 
account the following institutional constraint. Typically, in many European nations, the 
principal  cannot  offer  monetary  transfer  payments  to  local  agents  by  way  of 
compensating  them  for  high  search  effort.3  Obviously,  the  lack  of  such  policy 
                                                           
3 A rare example of contracts including compensation payments for government staff is given by Walsh (1995), 
who proposes payments to central bankers contingent on their curbing the inflation rate. Examples are more 
numerous in the case of public utilities, which may be able to retain some of the benefits of greater than 
projected productivity increases in (otherwise) average cost pricing regimes. With the 2007 reform of the salary 
system in the German public service (Tarifvertrag für den öffentlichen Dienst, or TVöD) some 1 percent of the  
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instruments considerably limits the scope for incentive-feasible budgeting by the central 
employment  office.  This  may  be  the  prime  reason  why  many  public-sector  facilities 
appear to function so inefficiently. In order to sidestep these institutional shortfalls, we 
offer an alternative scheme that dispenses with monetary side payments. Instead, the 
central employment office assigns staff to local job centers contingent on the underlying 
unemployment rate.  
In  a  repeated  relationship,  the  principal  can  offer  a  budgeting  plan  that 
predetermines the capacity of the staff assigned to the agent in the following period. 
Hence,  the  job  center  undertakes  its  mission  with  a  given  staff  capacity.  It  has  the 
prospect of gaining additional capacity in the next budget period if the unemployment 
rate  outcome  is  low.  That  said,  in  our  model  the  central  employment  office  clearly 
cannot effectively punish job centers that deliver a poor outcome by assigning them a 
very small staffing capacity in following period on account of the work load constraint. 
Accordingly,  there  is  a  trade-off  between  the  latter  and  the  incentive-compatibility 
constraint.  
In complete information settings, a constant staff capacity is assigned to a risk 
averse job center so as to provide full insurance. In a setting with unobservable effort, 
however, the central employment office must shift some risk on to the local job center to 
meet  the  incentive-compatibility  constraint.    Such  a  budgeting  scheme  can  only  be 
implemented if the risk averse job center receives a risk premium in the lucky case. 
Otherwise, the work load constraint will not be met. Hence, the central employment 
office faces a conflict between the work load constraint and the incentive-compatibility 
constraint of the job center. On the one hand, the central employment office should offer 
contracts that make local job centers in part a residual claimant of the matching outcome 
(unemployment  rate)  to  incentivize  search  effort.  On  the  other  hand,  it  must  take 
especial care that agents in the job center are not overloaded with work.  
The budgeting scheme we envisage is similar to a mechanism already in place in 
other areas of the public sector. But perhaps the most obvious example is home grown. 
Consider a professor of economics who applies for funding from the National Science 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
total salary payment can be paid as an output-related compensation. Section 18 of the TVöD allows for an 
expansion of the incentive component up to 8 percent in the future. Currently, however, the magnitude of the 
incentive component falls far short of providing high powered incentives and this is underscored by the fact that 
the scope for making incentive payments under section 18 is tightly limited.     
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Foundation.  Exerting  high  effort  increases  research  output  today  and  enhances  the 
likelihood of obtaining funding in the next period. Vulgo: funding from the NSF offers the 
prospect of an increase in staff capacity tomorrow.   
Our paper is firmly rooted in three strands of the broader literature. In the first 
place, it is related to the literature seeking to analyze the efficiency of operation of the 
public employment service. Closest in spirit perhaps is Sheldon’s (2003) comparatively 
recent analysis of the efficiency of the Swiss public employment service using a non-
parametric matching function. Relatedly, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) survey the 
micro-foundations, empirical evidence, and estimation issues underlying the aggregate 
matching  function.  The  specific  functional  form  of  the  matching  technology  that  is 
assumed in the frame of our model is in line with the foundations of these two important 
contributions. Additionally, we highlight the delegation problems that may be the very 
source  of  the  inefficiencies  in  the  public  employment  service  identified  by  Sheldon 
(2003).  
Necessarily we also refer to the search-theoretic literature based on frictional 
transactions  in  labor  markets  arising  from  incomplete  information.  In  line  with  this 
strand of the wider literature, we assume that unemployed job seekers must devote time 
and other resources to locate an adequate position (see Mortensen, 1970, 1986; Gronau, 
1971; McCall, 1970, Lippman and McCall, 1976; Merz, 1995). In particular, we refer to 
models  that  treat  search  intensity  as  an  endogenous  variable.  Here  it  is  shown  that 
search intensity is costly in terms of effort input and/or additional time spent on job 
search. However, the contact rate is assumed to be an increasing function of search 
effort  taken by job  seeker, or by those  supporting them (see  Rogerson, Shimer, and 
Wright, for a survey of this literature). 
But  of  course  our  main  interest  devolves  around  a  solution  to  the  delegation 
problem within the public employment service. We therefore we employ a principal-
agent model consistent with the efficiency wage theory of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) 
and Grossman and Hart’s (1982) theory of a managerial firm. A distinctive feature in our 
paper is the repeated relationship between principal and agent, in line with Chiappori, 
Macho,  Rey,  and  Salanié  (1994).  Further,  as  intimated  earlier,  our  model  contains  a 
payoff function of the agent containing non-monetary compensation for effort. Unlike 
the standard model, effort cost and compensation are non-separable in our treatment.   
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The outline of the paper is as follows. We first describe the basic principal-agent 
relationship, including the objective functions of the central employment office and the 
job center. We next outline a first-best optimal budget plan that an omniscient central 
employment office would offer to the job center. The first-best outcome then serves as a 
reference solution for our optimal budgeting scheme. A summary concludes.  
II. The Basic Model and Problem  
Job match unemployment  
Our basic assumption is that information about what is available on the labor market is 
not  easy  to  obtain.  In  particular,  search  on  the  part  of  unemployed  workers  for  a 
satisfactory vacancy takes time and involves some material search effort. In line with 
standard  search-theoretic  reasoning,  match  unemployment  –  the  time  unemployed 
workers search for a job – depends crucially on the contact rate  . This contact rate 
indicates the arrival number of job offers of which the unemployed worker learns and 
can choose between. Thus, the unemployment rate is expressed as a decreasing function 
of the contact rate, given by     .4 In practice, the contact rate will depend on many 
influences that are determined outside of the model; examples include the business 
cycle, region-specific shocks, and behavioral factors. The stochastic contact rate     in our 
model may be expected to reflect such elements. In particular, it can take two values 
       , with            . Equivalently, we can refer to a situation with a high contact 
rate   , yielding a low unemployment rate           , as the “lucky case” and    with 
           as the “unlucky case.”   
The public employment service 
Governments in most nations provide a public employment service   offering contacts 
(information  about  available  jobs)  to  unemployment  workers.  In  our  model,  the 
employment service   describes the intensity of job placement activities undertaken by a 
job center for each job seeker. The intensity of job placement activities does not simply 
express  the  time  devoted  by  a  placement  officer  to  an  individual  client.  It  further 
comprises counseling sessions, plus substantial data retrieval and career guidance. As 
                                                           
4 In line with the basic search-theoretic model, we consider a steady state unemployment rate that is a 
decreasing function of the contact rate.  The steady state unemployment rate is given by       
 
               , where   is the discount factor,      is the cumulative distribution function of the wage w 




the  job  center  can  be  interpreted  as  a  vertically  integrated  entity  in  the  public 
employment system we consider the service   as an intermediate product used as an 
input in the overall search process whose output is the expected unemployment rate   . 
In particular, we assume that the influence of the employment service   on the 
stochastic contact rate is characterized by the probabilities of the “lucky case” and the 
“unlucky  case,”  conditional  on  the  level  of  the  public  employment service   ,  namely 
                   .  Technically  speaking,  the  service  level  could  take  an  arbitrary 
value in       .  However, in the frame of the game with asymmetric information, it is 
reasonable  to  assume  that  there  is  some  threshold  service  level      which  must  be 
provided  so  that  the  employment  service  has  a  noticeable  effect.  In  particular,  we 
assume that the central employment office can detect if the job center provides a service 
level  below  the  critical    .  Above  the  threshold     however  the  central  employment 
office cannot quantify the service level. Intrinsically, the matching process is improved if 
a high-volume employment service is provided. In particular, the “lucky case” is more 
likely  if  the  amount  of  the  service  is  high  in  the  sense  of  first-order  stochastic 
dominance.  In  particular,  this  means  that  the  distribution  function           is  a 
decreasing and convex function of s. Then, the expected value         is an increasing 
and concave function of the employment service.5  
The technology of the search process  
The employment service   provided by the local job center can be considered as an 
intermediate product, whose inputs are labor   and effort  , with        and       .6 
More labor must be used in order to offer a more time consuming service  . As a second 
input and importantly for the analysis in our paper, the search for job vacancies calls for 
special initiatives by the staff in the job center, including firm contacts and/or career 
guidance. These special initiatives are represented by search effort   . Familiarly, the 
well-behaved  production  technology  of  the  employment  service  depending  on  labor 
input   and search effort   can be written           , with            ,             , 
            ,            ,             . Further, the value of the production function is 
zero at zero effort of labor and the limit of the derivative towards zero effort or labor is 
positive infinity. Further, we normalize the wage rate of staff   employed in the local job 
                                                           
5 See Appendix A.1.  
6 See Sheldon’s (2003) for a similar interpretation of search technology.   
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center to unity. The disutility for the staff of the job center associated with search effort 
  is given by the function       with           and           . 
Dynamic setting and timing within a sub-game 
Consistent  with  the  search-theoretic  framework,  the  principal-agent  relationship 
between the central employment office and the local job center is a repeated one. In line 
with the general setting of the search-theoretical model, we consider an infinite time 
horizon, where the periods are denoted by  , with              as well as a discount 
rate    which is valid for either the principal or the agent, with          . We assume 
that the principal possesses some commitment devices in order to offer a budgeting plan 
that  predetermines  the  capacity  or  employment  size  of  the  agency  in  the  following 
period       contingent on the observed outcome in  . However, the principal has no 
commitment  power  to  implement  a  long-term  contract  that  sets  out  in  advance  a 
scheme  for  more  than  one  period.  This  seems  to  be  rather  strong  assumption  on 
contract-theoretical  grounds.  However,  in  real  world  applications,  the  central 
employment office has typically a limited planning horizon. Accordingly, we denote by 
    
           
    the  staff  capacity  assigned  to  the  job  centre  in  period         if 
employment rate   
  in period   is observed. Further, the variables          and   
  signify 
the effort level, the employment service, and the unemployment rate, respectively, in the 
corresponding period  . The timing of the game at arbitrary points in time   and t+1 sees 
the players subsequently acting as follows:  
Stage 1.t  First, in period   , the central employment office offers budgeting scheme 
    
           
    for         to the local job center;  
Stage 2.t  In  the  second  step,  also  in  period  t,  the  local  job  office  chooses  an 
employment service    . The employment service is  effected by exerting 
search effort e, given the current staff capacity   
           
   ; 
Stage 3.t+1  Third, nature draws a contact rate    from a distribution conditional on    
which affects the unemployment rate in the following period      . 
Stage 4.t+1  Finally, the budgeting scheme     
           
    is executed in the following 
period      .  
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Due  to  the  limited  commitment  power,  the  central  employment  office  offers  a  new 
contract     
       
    in t+1 contingent on the unemployment rate     
  . 
 
The objective function of the central employment office 
We assume that the central employment office seeks to minimize the overall cost of the 
public  employment  service  necessary  to  establish  an  exogenously  given  level  of 
service       . Accordingly, it assigns a certain staff capacity to job centers in period t+1 
contingent on the output level observed in period t. As the size of the staff   
  assigned to 
the job center in the previous period       is a sunk cost for the central employment 
office, it can be omitted in the objective function: 
(1)                     
                 
            
Note  that  the  central  employment  office  is  risk  neutral  to  stochastic  (per-period) 
unemployment insurance payments as its objective function is linear in the outcome   . 
Objective function of the local job center 
The job center deploys a constant labor capacity that is predetermined by the central 
office. It can choose the employment service    by exerting costly search effort   . The 
per-period utility function of the job center can be written: 
(2)                              for                                          
where   is a constant utility from labor income. Different to the central employment 
office the job center is risk averse to a lottery of staff capacity. 
In  the  remainder  of  the  paper  we  will  often  make  use  of  the  inverse  of  the 
intermediate production function             
  . The inverse function tells us how much 
effort    the staff in the job center must exert in order to achieve a given employment 
service    via a given staff capacity   
 , namely             
  . Accordingly, the marginal 
cost of the employment service    from the viewpoint of the job center, confronted with 
a fixed capacity of staff    
 , is: 
(3)                   
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The marginal cost function of the employment service   , denoted by          is an 
increasing function in service    . Further, by the quasi-concavity of the intermediate 
production technology     
     , coupled with the ceteris paribus assumption, the value 
of        is the lower the higher staff capacity   
   (see Appendix A.1). 
Moreover, in line with the standard literature on hidden action, we consider a 
maximum work load that can be set by the central authorities within a period to provide 
a given employment service   . Formally, the work load constraint is identical to the 
individual rationality constraint in the standard principal-agent model. Here, we shall 
assume  that  the  job-center  agents  can  inter-temporally  balance  the  risk  of  a  low 
unemployment rate within the two-period horizon. In the particular framework of the 
present model, one can think of the maximum workload as being determined by a union 
that may elect to go on strike if it is not met because of an insufficient capacity of the 
staff. However, as we will show below, the main results would not change if the work 
load constraint had strictly to be met within one period.7 The agent’s expected pay-off in 
the two-period horizon is given by: 
(4)                
                            
                             
      
Assuming  that  the  overall  reservation  utility  of  placement  officers  is  given  by  an  
exogenously  given  reservation  utility   ,  we  can  formulate  the  maximum  work  load 
constraint (   ) as follows: 
                        
              
               
               
               
       
                      
             
           .                         
 
Using the objective function of the job center (2), we can equivalently write: 
         
              
               
               
               
    
                              
             
            
The maximum workload constraint WC crucially depends on three variables: the 
current staff capacity   
 ; the lottery of staff capacity in the following period       
   ; and 
the certain amount of services to be provided in the current period t and in the following 
period t+1, namely   
 . For given a current staff capacity   
  and levels of service  
  the 
                                                           
7 The case where the workload constraint must be strictly met within one period is in line with the limited 
liability constraint in the standard principal-agent literature.   
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central employment office must offer a budgeting plan that promises a sufficiently high 
expected level of staffing       
   . Otherwise, the job center’s reservation utility D will 
not be met. Further, for a given level of service   
 , single placement officers must exert 
higher costly search effort    if the staff capacity is low. This again calls for a higher 
expected level of staffing       
    as stated in Lemma 1. Here, either the job center is 
confronted with a low capacity of   
  , due to a low output in the previous period      , or 
with a high capacity   
 , due to a high output in period      . 
Lemma 1: The capacity of the staff which is assigned to the job center in period        
crucially  depends  on  the  capacity  in  the  previous  period   :  If  the  staff  capacity    
   is 
relatively high the central office can offer a more opportune lottery of staff capacity for the 
following period      
  .  
Proof: see Appendix A.2. 
III. First-Best Optimal Budgeting  
As a benchmark, we initially assume that the central employment office can observe the 
performance of the employment service   
  that is locally provided in every period  . For 
a given level of service   
 , it implements the least-cost combination of inputs   
  and    
by  assigning  staff  capacity.  Here  we  assume  that  the  central  employment  office  can 
punish the local job center, if the latter do not comply with the contractual terms or 
targets.8 Additionally, the central employment office must take into account that the 
endeavor of the job center is limited and crucially depends on staffing.  
As an added complication, we have also to recognize that the central employment 
office effectively cannot make monetary compensatory payments to its agencies. This is 
because  the German public s ervice  salary system (or  TVöD)  contains an incentive 
component amounting to just 1 per cent of the salary.  And similar regulations  are in 
place in other European nations more generally. Rather, the reward will take the form of 
additional staff that the central employment office assigns to the job center. As such 
labor is also used to produce the observed outcome  – the public employment service – 
                                                           
8  In real world applications, the central employment office may hardly punish a local job center that fails 
to fulfill its duties. Here, we eschew discussion of the possible institutional constraints that may avoid 
punishment of the local job center as the full information case should be chiefly regarded as a benchmark 
solution.   
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‘compensation’ in terms of a higher staff can only be provided with a time lag of at least 
one period.   
Let us consider the minimization problem of principal at a arbitrary point of time  : 
(5)               
        
                 
                 
   
subject to (WC) and       
 . 
Lagrange’s  method  yields  the  following  first  order  condition  w.r.t.  the  staff  capacity 
    
       
   in the “lucky” and “unlucky” cases, respectively:  
(6)                       
       
      
              
   
        
         
       
      
              
   
        
     
Via equation (3), the first order condition (6) may be written:  
(7)                       
         
              
                
         
              
     
The  first  order  condition  with  respect  to  the  assignment  of  staff  to  the  job  center 
contingent on the state of the nature yields the optimal coinsurance between principal 
and agent due to the Borch rule.9  As the principal is risk neutral while the agent is risk 
averse, the principal will assign an identical number of employees to the local job centre 
irrespective of the state of nature.  
Proposition 1: The central employment office assigns the same staff capacity to the local 
job center irrespective of the unemployment rate in the current period.   
Further,  it  becomes  obvious  that  at  any  contracting  date   ,  the  central 
employment office offers a contract on the spot that predefines the staff capacity of job 
centers contingent on the unemployment rate. The optimization problem is the same at 
any contracting date apart from the staff capacity that has been assigned in the previous 
period. Thus, the continuation budgeting plan consisting of sequential spot contracts is 
an optimal solution to the continuation contracting problem for the remaining periods 
and has a constant value over time. As this game with complete information in every 
period is a sub-game, we can reduce the dynamic model to consideration of a single 
period. 
                                                           
9 For a more detailed exploration of the principle of optimal coinsurance, see Borch (1962).  
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Proposition  2:  At  any  date     the  contract  is  an  optimal  solution  to  the  continuation 
contracting problem for the remaining periods. Therefore, it is sufficient to analyze the 
equilibrium policy decisions of the sub-game. 
IV. Optimal Budgeting under Moral Hazard 
In this section we assume that the employment service    as well as search effort    are 
unobservable to the central employment office. Consequently, the latter cannot offer a 
contract that directly specifies search effort    or employment service   . Instead, it can 
only write a contract contingent on the observable unemployment rate   
 . Due to this 
contract-specific environment it needs be worthwhile for the local job center to provide 
the desired level of service   
 . Otherwise, it may be expected to supply a lower level of 
effort  that  is  unobservable  to  the  principal.  Hence,  the  central  employment  office 
budgeting  strategy  must  meet  the  following  incentive-compatibility  constraint: 
               
    
              
               
               
               
      
         
                            
                             
                                                                                                                                                                  
The incentive-compatibility constraint (IC) tells us that it is not profitable for the 
job center to provide a level of service    in period   different to that    desired by the 
central employment office.10 Accordingly, the latter must offer a lottery of staff capacity 
    
   in period       contingent on the state of the nature   so that a particular service   
  
minimizes agents’ expected costs: 
  
                    
                           
                            
       
subject to        . 
Assuming an interior solution the first order condition is as follows:  
(8)                         
                
                    
             
       
     
Most importantly, from the first order condition (8) we learn that the staff capacity in 
the  lucky  and  unlucky  cases  must  be  fixed  at  a  particular  ratio.  This  ratio  depends 
                                                           
10 Note that we have assumed that the central employment office will implement a desired service level    
in the following period t+1 as well. Therefore we have replaced              
     by            
     in the 
incentive-compatibility constraint.   
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crucially on the distribution of states   in the following period as well as on the level of 
service   
   and      in the current period   as well as in the following period      .  
Let  us  in  the  interests  of  completeness  consider  the  pathological  case  of  a 
boundary  solution.  If  the  critical  service  level      is  relatively  small,  the  cost  of  an 
additional unit of service level at        borne by the job center can be higher than the 
benefits given by the right-hand-side of equation (8). In this case the job center will tend 
to  choose  the  boundary  service  level      and  the  central  employment  office  cannot 
incentivize a higher service through an appropriate budgeting scheme. However, having 
distinguished  the  case  of  a  critical  service  level    ,  the  frame  of  our  model  clearly 
supports the interior solution given by equation (8).   
The optimal lottery of staff capacity in the following period 
For simplicity, we need first to solve a sub-problem of the central agency’s minimization 
problem by focusing on the ratio of staff capacity that the central employment office will 
provide under the optimal budgeting mechanism. Accordingly, we assume that under 
moral hazard the service level   
  is implemented at the level of job centers. The reduced 
optimization problem of the central employment office is then the following:  
               
       
           
       
           
       
   
subject to (WC) and equation (8), namely,  
        
                
                    
                   
    
and         
 . 
Lagrange’s method leads to the following first order conditions w.r.t. the capacity 
of the staff in       contingent on  : 
(9)                                         
           
                
        
  
       
    
(10)                                   
           
                
        
  
         
    
If the Lagrange multiplier    is equal to zero, we obtain the same result as in 
section III: agents are fully insured against the unlucky case. However, in the optimum 
the incentive-compatibility constraint is binding so that    assumes a positive value. As a  
 
15 
result, the risk averse job center is not fully insured against unlucky outcomes of the 
search process. If the unlucky case arises, insurance benefits to unemployed workers are 
substantial. In these circumstances, the central employment office shifts some risks on 
to the job center and reduces its wage bill below the level of the first-best case. In the 
event of the lucky case, however, the agent is rewarded and hence a staff capacity is 
assigned to it that is somewhat higher than in the first-best case. 
In order to illustrate this result, we derive the central office’s budgeting scheme 
from the first order conditions (9) and (10): 
    
               
    
                
where   is the inverse function of the first order condition that is increasing in   . Figure 










The horizontal line at     
    signifies the first-best optimal scheme which by proposition 3 
assigns an equal work force to centers with high as well as low output. Under moral 
hazard, job centers are only partly insured against labor market shocks. Therefore the 
budget scheme is a decreasing function of the unemployment rate with a budget     
   
(    
  ) if unemployment rate   (  ) occurs. The slope of the budget constraint depends 
crucially on the capacity in the previous period   as we have already derived in lemma 1. 
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The slope is relatively flat if the capacity in the previous period is relatively high and 
conversely. 
Proposition 3: The central employment office offers a budget scheme in which a higher 
staff  capacity  is  assigned  to  the  job  center  than  in  the  first-best  optimal  case  if  the 
unemployment rate is low and a lower capacity than in the first-best optimal case if the 
unemployment rate is high.  
Proof: see Appendix A.4. 
Further, we can derive that the slope of the budgeting scheme must be sufficiently steep. 
Due to the convexity of the disutility function, a risk premium must be paid to the risk 
averse  agent  in  order  to  meet  the  work  load  constraint  since  that  agent  is  now 
confronted with a lottery      
      
   . From Jensen’s inequality, we can establish that  
                                                     
                            
       
                     
                 
                                                                                          
obtains. The expected staff capacity that meets the work load capacity must be larger if 
the  budgeting  scheme  offered  shifts  some  risk  on  to  the  agent.  According  to  the 
budgeting scheme depicted in the figure the difference between the first best optimal 
work force     
    and the work force     
   offered in the “lucky case” is greater than the 
difference  between  the  first  best  optimal  work  force      
     and  the  work  force      
   
offered in the “unlucky case” under moral hazard.11 
An important concern in the practical application is that a local job center that 
faces the “lucky case” consecutively for several periods does not accumulate a large staff.  
We believe that such a budget cannot be supported in the political process. However, 
                                                           
11 The existence of a risk premium implies that there is a tradeoff between incentivizing job centers to 
exert search effort and insuring them against labor market shocks. In this sense it may be profitable for 
the central employment office to reduce the level of desirable service      This may go along with an 
optimal incentive scheme that shifts less risk on to local job centers and hence entails a lower risk prime 
necessary to fulfill the work load constraint. However, in the present treatment we focus on the 
implementation of an exogenously given service level because there are many other factors determining 
the desirable level of service apart from the monetary cost borne by the central employment office 
(consider the sociological, political, and psychological arguments that can be advanced to justify a high 
level of service provision) and which the underlying partial equilibrium model abstracts from. Instead, the 
proper budgeting scheme that assigns a lottery of staff capacity to job centers does not alter important 
factors of the labor market. Hence, we believe that alterations to the workforce can be made in an 





our underlying budget mechanism precludes the accumulation of staff capacity over a 
longer period of time.    
In particular, the central employment office offers budgeting schemes on the spot, 
as it can tailor its budgeting scheme in each period contingent on the current capacity. In 
Appendix A.5 we show that the aforementioned risk premium is a decreasing function of 
the capacity available in the current period  .  In this case, the Lagrange multiplier    will 
assume a relatively high value if capacity   
  is low and conversely if capacity    
  is high. 
We can state the following proposition: 
Proposition 4: If staff capacity in the current period is very high, the optimal budgeting 
strategy for the following period entails a small wedge between the staff capacity in the 
following period       for the lucky case     
   and for the unlucky case     
  , respectively 
.  
Proof: see Appendix A.5 
The economic intuition behind this result is as follows. If the job center faces a high 
capacity in the current period, the marginal cost of providing the service is relatively 
low. Hence, incentivizing search effort on the part of the job center is not a major issue. 
The central employment office merely needs to shift risk to the job center to a small 
extent and the underlying risk premium is of little account.  
V. Conclusion  
The  purpose  of  this  study  has  been  to  analyze  a  fundamental  delegation  problem 
inherent in the public employment service. Typically, local job centers commissioned to 
serve as match makers in imperfect labor markets enjoy some discretion in reducing 
their work load because neither their search intensity in linking job seekers to vacancies 
nor  the  resulting  contact  rate  is  verifiable  by  the  central  agency.  Poor  institutional 
performance, as well as high rates of matching unemployment, might therefore result. 
To deal with the problem of moral hazard in public employment service institutions we 
employ a search-theoretic model in which the central agency must provide incentives to 
increase  the  search  effort  of  local  job  centers  and  hence  the  contact  rate.  Using  a 
mechanism  design  approach,  we  propose  a  budgeting  scheme  wherein  greater  staff 
capacity is provided to successful agencies achieving high matching rates.   
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So as  to  facilitate exposition  we  have  considered a  rather stylized model, the 
results of which are nonetheless valid in a generalized framework. For example, the real 
world context of the present treatment is a milieu in which the principal (the central 
employment office) cannot pay any direct monetary transfers to its agents (local job 
centers). We have shown how the principal can circumvent this institutional constraint 
by designing a budgeting scheme that assigns additional staff to the job center in future 
periods. And what of the optimal budgeting strategy in regimes where both monetary 
transfers  and  additional  staff  can  be  deployed  to  achieve  the  risk  prime?  It  is 
straightforward to show in this case that it is optimal for the principal to allocate staff to 
the local job center in a first-best optimal manner and pay a monetary transfer in order 
to meet the workload constraint.  
Further,  we  have  assumed  that  the  principal  can  only  commit  to  a  policy  to  be 
implemented in the following period      .  That said, it is again straightforward to show 
that the results presented here also hold if the principal can commit to offer a contract 
pre-committing staffing levels for a countable number of future periods. The principal 
has no incentive to postpone the assignment of additional staff which is necessary to 
secure the risk prime staff into the future. Moreover, our analysis can be extended to 
encompass more than the two states of nature considered here. To this end, however, 
we would have to assume that the monotonous likelihood ratio property be fulfilled in 













 (A.1)  The  expected  unemployment  rate  is  given  by                                  
                    .  For the binary case, first-order stochastic dominance is fulfilled if 
             and              . Then, 
        
       and 
        
       , so that the stochastic 
output function with input s has the conventional properties.  
(A.2)  Due  to  the  concavity  of  the  intermediate  production  function,  the  effort  level 
necessary to produce the desired    in the lucky case in period t [i.e.        
  ] exceeds 
the effort level in the unlucky case in period t [ i.e.        
  ]. Therefore, the cost of 
providing    is higher in the unlucky case, and calls for a more opportune lottery in the 
following period        
(A.3) The job center which decides to provide a level of service   see itself confronted 
with the following constraint cost minimization problem. It minimizes effort cost       
subject to a given level of service and a given work force.  
                      
            
where    is the Lagrange multiplier. Then, the first order condition can be written: 
        
       
     
     
      
Using the envelope theorem we can derive that          
      exceeds          
    for all   
  
smaller than   
 . 
(A.4)  By  first  order  stochastic  dominance  we  can  derive  the  following  inequality: 
        
  
       
  
 
        
  
           
  
      
Adding up equations (10) and (11) yields: 
 
(12)                    
                      
             
        
  
       
    
        
  
         
     
By Appendix A.2 the left hand side-value of equation (12) is negative if     
  exceeds     
    
In this case the multiplier    on the right-hand side must take a positive value as the 
term in brackets is negative.  
 
20 
(A.5)  Let  us  assume  that  the  staff  capacity  goes  to  infinity.  Then  the  marginal 
productivity of effort      
      will converge to a very high value, denoted by     The 
agent’s  marginal  cost  of  service  provision  thus  converges  to  the  limit  value 
               
       
  .  As  the  cost  of  an  additional  unit     borne  by  the  agent 
approximates a relatively low value, the multiplier    converges to low value as well. 
Accordingly, the optimal budgeting scheme under moral hazard does not entail a high 
wedge between the staff capacity in the following period      , namely     
   and     
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